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LIFE INSURANCE AND FEDERAL TAXES
Daniel Candee Knickerbocker, Jr.t
We all remember a few dates. We all have a vague idea that something
important happened in 1066 or 1492 or 1776, that after the events of
each of those years the world was somehow different. The world of the
"tax wallah' is more circumscribed. To him the years to remember are
1913, 1916, 1939, and 1954. The first of these brought the federal in-
come tax; the second the estate tax; the third the internal revenue codi-
fication; and the fourth its first major attempt at reform.
I was not on hand for the 1913 and 1916 ceremonies and was too busy
being a college undergraduate when 1939 rolled around. But by 1954
I was up to my ears in the practice of tax law and remember the legis-
lative events of that year as a somewhat extended-but very merry-
Walpurgisnacht.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 had its genesis in the cry for re-
form. As the years had passed our tax rates had gone steadily upward,
the attempts to avoid their impact had become increasingly tortuous, the
lawyer-invented loopholes required correspondingly larger and more com-
plicated plugs, and more and more congressional time was spent in en-
acting "technical amendments"-special provisions designed to give relief
in hard cases. All of this inevitably bred demands for simplification and
equity, and the result was the 984-page statute which became law on
August 16, 1954.
To the sponsors of this document its birth was cause for dancing in
the streets. Not only had there been a logical rearrangement and more
understandable rewording of the tax law, there had been substantive
changes made as well whose purpose was
to remove inequities, to end harassment of the taxpayer and to reduce tax
barriers to future expansion of production and employment.2
The reformers, 3 on the other hand, found the new code nothing but a
source of pain. The attempt at simplification they found only partially
successful.' As for the removal of inequities, they could not even bring
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 449, for biographical data.
1 The generic description of lawyers who practice enough tax law to enable them to
discuss its problems in terms of section numbers of the Internal Revenue Code. There are
less of them around today than there were prior to August 16, 1954.
2 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954).
3 This word must not be understood in any pejorative sense. It is used here as a short-
hand identification for all those who think there should be a general overhaul of the tax
law, a class that includes with equal hospitality both the AFL-CIO and the NAM, Norris
Darrell and Stanley Surrey.
4 Cf. Darrell, "Internal Revenue Code of 1954-A Striking Example of the Legislative
Process in Action," 7 U. So. Calif. Tax Inst. 1, 29-32 (1955); Slowinski, "The Internal
Revenue Code of 1954: A General Consideration," 40 A.B.A.J. 1037, 1039 (1954).
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themselves to admit there had been an attempt. "There is general agree-
ment," wrote Randolph Paul a year later, "that something strenuous
needs to be done. ... This process of erosion and patchwork amendment
must stop somewhere . . .
And so the cry for reform continues to be heard, to grow in volume,
and it may be that 1958-or 1959-or perhaps 1960-will be another
year to add to the tax man's list of memorable dates. We might as well
face it. Another great revision, perhaps the greatest of all, is in the
making.
The purpose of this paper is not to test the question of the need for
reform. Rather, I would like here to consider one of the areas in which
reform is said to be necessary and to attempt an analysis of such argu-
ments as well as the obstacles to change. The general subject is life
insurance which, we are told, enjoys a peculiarly favored position.
I
It was Mr. Justice Cardozo who observed that "in the thought of many"
the purchase of life insurance is "a pressing social duty."6 Whatever the
motive, during 1956 (the last year for which figures are now available)
Americans purchased more than $55,000,000,000 in life insurance coverage
and at the end of that year were insured to the tune of $412,630,000,000.1
These are good round figures and suggest that, as a nation, we believe in
life insurance. Some of our belief doubtless stems from the way in which
this form of investment is sheltered from the tax laws.
The nature of the shelter is simply stated. Generally speaking, neither
the current earnings on savings invested in life insurance nor the proceeds
payable upon the death of the insured are subjected to income tax.8
And if the insured effectively manages to divest himself of all the
"incidents of ownership" in his policies before he dies, no part of the
proceeds payable to beneficiaries other than his estate will be subjected
to the federal estate tax.
5 Paul, "Erosion of the Tax Base and Rate Structure," in Federal Tax Policy for
Economic Growth and Stability 297, 307 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Federal Tax Policy).
For other criticisms see Federal Tax Policy, supra; Surrey, "The Congress and the Tax
Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1957);
DeWind, "A Technical Appraisal of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954," 8 Nat'l Tax J.
40 (1955). Finally there is the admission both in Congress and at the Treasury that the
tax law is still in need of reform. See H.R. 41 and 4203 and S. 769, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957), which would establish a "Hoover-type" commission "to study and investigate the
fundamental tax policy and the tax structure of the Federal Government." See also N.Y.
World Telegram and Sun, Jan. 20, 1958, p. 5, col. 1.
6 Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 681 (1933).
7 1958 World Almanac 760.
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101. This is an over-simplified statement of the income
tax rule but is believed sufficient for present purposes. The best available summary of the
complete rule appears in Casner, "The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Estate Planning,"
68 Harv. L. Rev. 222, 244-50 (1954).
9 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042.
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These are the principles. Now, what are the reasons for changing
them?
II
Each life insurance premium is designed to cover three things: the cost
of current insurance, the company's expenses of administration, and
savings. As the policy ages, its value (payable upon surrender or avail-
able as loan collateral) increases by the amount saved plus the interest
earned thereon. By the time an ordinary "whole life" policy has been in
force about fifteen years the amount of each annual increase in value is
just about equal to the premium paid. Similarly, when the insured finally
dies the proceeds paid his beneficiary consist of three elements. These
are a return of his savings, the interest earned on them to the date of
his death, and an amount equal to the difference between the face of the
policy and the sum of savings and interest which is the pure insurance
item.'0 The two things the reformers want to subject to income tax are
the current interest earnings on savings and that part of the death pro-
ceeds constituting pure insurance. As a palliative for the outraged feel-
ings of policyholders, however, it is also urged that a new deduction be
allowed for that part of the premiums used to buy current insurance
protection. The interest earnings would be taxed and the premium de-
duction would be allowed to the insured; the pure insurance part of
the proceeds would be taxed to their recipients, the beneficiaries.,'
The general exemption for life insurance proceeds has been part of
the statute, almost without modification, since 1913.1' The abbreviated
legislative history of that faraway day suggests two possible reasons for
the rule, namely, Congress' usual tender regard for widows, and a vague
sense that the item in question was like a legacy which no one ever in-
tended to be considered as income.' 3
More recently, spokesmen for the life insurance companies have in-
ferred another congressional motive, a belief in the social desirability of
life insurance. 4 Such a belief has never been officially expressed.
It is possible, of course, that the Constitution itself might stand in the
way of an income tax on life insurance proceeds. They simply may not
constitute "income" within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment.
10 This analysis is lifted in its entirety from Vickrey, "Insurance Under the Federal
Income Tax," 52 Yale LJ. 554, 560 (1943).
11 Vickrey, supra note 10, at 561-63. Randolph Paul urged the taxation of no more
than the interest element-apparently on a current basis-to the insured. Paul, "Erosion
of the Tax Base and Rate Structure," in Federal Tax Policy 297, 301 (1955).
12 Tariff Act of 1913, § II. B, 38 Stat. 167.
13 50 Cong. Rec. 508, 1239 (1913).
14 Brunstrom, "The Life Insurance, Endowment and Annuity Features of the 1954
Code," 32 Taxes 866, 868 (1954); Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the Senate Committee on
Finance, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1303, 1950, 1972 (1942).
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The Supreme Court has never passed upon this point and in the only
case before it in which the constitutional argument was made the justices
were able to avoid a decision by finding the statutory exemption applica-
ble.15 Without embarking upon the detailed analysis required for such
a determination, I am inclined to believe a constitutional objection would
fail. The beneficiary's receipt of proceeds seems to meet all the tests
of economic gain and realization that lie at the root of the income
concept.16
It may, however, be somewhat more difficult to include current in-
terest accretions to life insurance savings as income. Indeed, our fore-
most authority on the nature of income has flatly stated that such an
inclusion "runs counter to our general philosophy that income shall not
be taxed until it comes to hand, actually or constructively" and "lies be-
yond any current application of the doctrine of constructive receipt."'
7
One may question this view and there is at least one ruling that holds a
very similar form of income taxable."8 But the constitutional objection
to a tax at this level takes on more weight when what we desire to call
income has not been reduced to possession.
A system of information returns would probably make the collection
of tax from both insured and beneficiary relatively easy. Nevertheless,
we cannot be certain that present methods of writing and carrying insur-
ance would be continued if the tax rules were changed. The American
imagination, always most fertile when applied to the avoidance of rules
that seem illogical or unfair, may be depended upon to find new methods
for doing old things. And perhaps the mere burden of exceedingly com-
plex computations would bring down the proposed system. Its propo-
nents confess to some such worry.19
Finally, there is the policy question. Even if Congress has not yet
admitted its belief in insurance it may well do so in the future. The
argument of social desirability is not wholly implausible and one can
hardly foretell the result if our legislators are ever again subjected to
the vehemence of that agent from Cowley, Wyoming, who once told them
that any proposal to tax life insurance is dangerous, that
to in any way, directly or indirectly, discourage the purchase of legal
15 United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189 (1924).
16 Cf. Magill, Taxable Income 450-51 (rev. ed. 1945). Paul, "Life Insurance, Annuities
and the Income Tax," in Studies in Federal Taxation, Third Series 351, 355 (1940), suggests
that perhaps life insurance proceeds payable to individual (as opposed to corporate)
beneficiaries are not income in the constitutional sense.
"V Magill, "The Impact of Income Tax Leakages-A Postscript to Randolph Paul," 12
Tax L. Rev. 1, 10 (1956).
18 I.T. 3907, 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 46 (interest credited to building and loan share accounts).
19 Vickrey, "Insurance Under the Federal Income Tax," 52 Yale LJ. 554, 564-65 (1943).
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reserve life insurance ... is only to dignify and encourage indolence and
irresponsibility throughout our land.2 °
But even if you object to subsidizing a particular form of savings you
may still question the need for taxing a form of income (if it is income)
so universally enjoyed. It is possible, as Roswell Magill has suggested,
that enough of our people own life insurance so that "this tax leakage
does not really derange the equity of the tax system.1
21
III
The favoritism supposed to be accorded life insurance by the estate
tax law is more subtle. Under the present statute, as under all prior law
since the first enactment of a federal estate tax in 1916,2 life insurance
proceeds payable at the death of the insured to his estate are wholly taxa-
ble. But if such proceeds are payable to some other beneficiary they are
includible in the gross estate only if at the time of his death the insured
"'possessed... any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone
or in conjunction with any other person" in the policies.2 3
This is not to say, of course, that insurance proceeds payable to named
beneficiaries will never be includible in the insured's gross estate. There
may, as is pointed out below, be other sections of the statute that en-
compass them. But they will not be included merely because they are
insurance and this is true even though the insured paid all or some portion
of the premiums.
The rule above stated is one of the major substantive changes in the
tax law effected by the 1954 Code. Under the earlier law the payment
of premiums alone had been sufficient to require taxation. 4 But this, it
was thought, involved an unjustified discrimination against a particular
form of property. 5 In the words of the Ways and Means Committee
report, "no other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent
initially purchased it and then long before his death gave away all rights
to the property.
' 2 6
On its face this argument makes sense. If I do surrender all the rights
I have under an insurance policy-the right to cash it in, the right to
borrow against it, the right to change the beneficiary-how can there be
20 Testimony of Grant Taggart, Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1942 Before the
House Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2384-85 (1942).
21 Magill, "The Impact of Income Tax Leakages-A Postscript to Randolph Paul," 12
Tax L. Rev. 1, 11 (1956).
22 Revenue Act of 1916, § 201, 39 Stat. 777.
23 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042(2).
24 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(g), as amended by Revenue Act of 1942, § 404, 56 Stat.
944-45. The checkered history of life insurance under the federal estate tax prior to 1942
is recounted in 1 Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 485-516 (1942).
25 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954).
26 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954).
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any ground for including its proceeds in my estate and levying a tax on
them? What does my continued payment of premiums have to do with it?
I made a gift of the policy and I am making a gift of each premium.
But to the reformers the new law "opened the door for substantial
tax avoidance."27 It is no excuse, they say, to point to the estate tax
treatment of other property, for
life insurance is not like other property. It is inherently testamentary
in nature. It is designed, in effect, to serve as a will, regardless of its
investment features.
28
With all respect for the authors of these words it must be suggested
that they have engaged in mere labelling. The words "inherently testa-
mentary," of course, can mean whatever you like. If, however, we con-
sider them descriptive of any property disposition which provides for
events that may or will occur after the death of the donor, they obviously
are not confined in their application to life insurance.
Recurrent throughout the reformers' thought on the subject of life
insurance are two basic themes. The first is a determination that life
insurance agents must not be allowed to benefit from the provisions of
federal tax law. There is constant reference to the fact that these deep-
dyed traitors are "openly" urging people to buy insurance and save
taxes. 9 Somehow this is more reprehensible than the similar conduct of
dealers in real estate, municipal bonds or oil investments. I must con-
fess that I don't understand the distinction.
But what really bothers the reformers is money. They find it im-
possible to forget the enormous disparity between the face amount of an
insurance policy and the amount of the firit premium. Louis Eisenstein
has given us the example of a forty-year-old man who could provide a
$900,000 life insurance estate for his wife and three children at no cost
either to himself or his beneficiaries in either gift or estate taxes.30
The reformers have a case, of course, only if this well-fixed husband
fails to live out his life expectancy. If he were to pay into a trust each
year the same amount of money he paid in premiums, his wife and chil-
dren might end up with even more money just as free of tax.31
27 Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 280 (1956). The words quoted are,
of course, those used by all of us whenever referring to a provision of law of which we
disapprove, but in this context they are Messrs. Lowndes' and Kramer's very own.
28 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. B14 (1954) (minority views).
29 Eisenstein, "The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax," in Federal Tax Policy 819,
842 (1955); H.R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918).
30 Eisenstein, supra note 29, at 842. The annual premium in this example is $24,000.
By splitting this up into four $6,000 segments and taking advantage of the marital deduc-
tion and the annual exclusions of both husband and wife the total premium passes free of
gift tax. The same argument is made in Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift
Taxes 280-81 (1956).
81 The Treasury's tables in U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1954), give a forty-year-old male
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It is for this reason that the Treasury has indicated it would find
something less than full includibility on grounds of payment of premiums
an acceptable substitute for present law. The proposal to subject to
estate tax only "the difference between the proceeds ... and the reserve
at the time of death or possibly cash-surrender value at the time of
death?" 2 is designed to catch up with the insured who has managed to
win his gamble with the company by means of an early death.
The occasional windfall to a few beneficiaries seems scant justification
for the imposition of an estate tax on insurance proceeds generally. It
may, however, be the justification for subjecting some part of those pro-
ceeds to an income tax.
The best argument against restoring the premium payment test-with
all its complexities-to our law is the fact that the windfalls the reformers
so detest may not after all be tax-free.
The law requires inclusion in a decedent's gross estate of all property
transferred by him "in contemplation of death." There is a rebuttable
presumption that all transfers during the three-year period ending on the
date of death were so made; transfers before that period cannot be taxed
on this ground.38 It seems a foregone conclusion that if the decedent has
given away a life insurance policy during this three-year period the pro-
ceeds will be thrown into his taxable estate. This is not merely a ques-
tion of the standard of proof required to overcome the statutory presump-
tion. Life insurance transfers may almost be said as a matter of law to
be in contemplation of death.34 Moreover, if the decedent merely paid
premiums during the three-year period, estate tax would probably be
imposed upon that portion of the proceeds equal to the proportion borne
by the payments to the total premiums paid by the decedent throughout
a life expectancy of 33.8 years. Annual payments of $24,000 accumulated at 3% (in tax-
exempt revenue bonds, for example) will amount to $1,385,524.24 at the end of thirty-four
years. An accumulation trust the income and corpus of which are to be distributed to
named beneficiaries upon the death of the grantor will dearly escape taxation in the
grantor's estate by virtue of the operation of Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2037, if the grantor
retained no interest in the trust.
32 List of Substantive Unintended Benefits and Hardships and Additional Problems for
the Technical Amendments Bill of 1957, Item 27 (1956). A similar suggestion had been
made fifteen years earlier in Schlesinger, "Taxes and Insurance: A Suggested Solution to the
Uncertain Cost of Dying," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 226 (1941). The Congressional response to
the Treasury's proposal, original section 56, of the Technical Amendments Bill of 1957 (H.R.
8381), was a compromise and therefore more complicated. Essentially it would have sub-
jected to tax only that part of the proceeds produced by the insured's premium payments
during the five years immediately before his death. H.R. Rep. No. 775, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 96 (1957). However, when the bill was called up in the House a committee amend-
ment deleted this proposed revision of § 2042. 104 Cong. Rec. 1049-50 (daily ed., Jan. 28,
1958).
33 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035.
84 Cf. Bailey v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 617, modified, 30 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1939),
superseded by 31 F. Supp. 778 (Ct. Cl.), cert. dismissed on stipulation, 311 U.S. 721
(1940), 25 Cornell L.Q. 605 (1940).
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his life.35 The result here is to tax most heavily the man who has had the
greatest success in winning his gamble with the company.
The other and rather less certain ground for including the proceeds of
transferred life insurance in the decedent's estate is that he has retained
a reversionary interest whose value exceeds the maximum 5% permitted
by the statute .3  This is the result of the clause contained (so far as I
know) in all life insurance policies, a clause it seems impossible to have
deleted, which provides that if all the beneficiaries named in the policy
die before receiving payment of the proceeds such proceeds shall be paid
to the estate of the insured. The requirement of the proposed estate tax
regulations that the existence of a reversion must be determined only
after taking into account "any incidents of ownership held by others
immediately before the decedent's death"37 will certainly afford some pro-
tection. But I cannot agree with those writers, who regard the problem
as completely solved."
Needless to say, the concern over whether or not the payment of
premiums should result in the inclusion of the proceeds in the insured's
estate is part of a general concern lest rich men's estates escape their
fair shares of tax. It has been suggested that whatever tax avoidance
there may be here is the result not of loopholes in the law but rather of
the fact that some people are wealthier than others. The theory is that
if we don't let the rich pull parts of their estates out of the tax base by
buying life insurance they'll accomplish the same results in other ways.
39
This is the argument made by George May in reference to the income
tax-that the whole system is like a football game which is no fun unless
you can break through the line and make a touchdown once in a while.40
I prefer to believe our tax law is based on rather more logical principles.
Finally, for what it is worth, there is the argument that the premium
payment test for taxing life insurance proceeds violates the constitutional
prohibition on direct taxes without apportionment.4 This was the view
of the seventh circuit in the surprisingly recent case of Kohl v. United
35 Liebmann v. Hassett, 50 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1943), aff'd, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir.
1945).
36 Under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042(2), "the term 'incident of ownership' includes
a reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other instru-
ment or by operation of law) only if the value of such reversionary interest exceeded 5 per-
cent of the value of the policy immediately before the death of the decedent."
37 Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(3) (1954).
38 Cf. Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 289 (1956).
39 Munch, "Estate Tax Problems in Transfers of Life Insurance," 15 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed.
Tax. 219, 226-27 (1957).
40 Quoted in Paul, "Erosion of the Tax Base and Rate Structure," in Federal Tax Policy
297, 306 (1955).
41 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, d. 4.
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States.42 Both the Service 43 and the Tax Court44 have indicated their
disagreement. For the reasons given at length in Messrs. Lowndes' and
Kramer's admirable text I would not recommend too great reliance on
the Constitution for this purpose.45
IV
The arguments for subjecting life insurance to more stringent tax treat-
ment cannot be brushed aside. To allow any economic gain to escape
income taxation is contrary to the spirit of our law and, unless the estate
and gift taxes are merely window dressing, it is equally distressing when
substantial property transfers can be made tax-free. It is no argument
here to assert that no tax is imposed on other forms of income or other
transfers. Wrongs do not make other wrongs right. But it is permissible
to argue that before we start taxing life insurance more heavily than we
do we can and should pursue the other, the more obvious, the far more
expensive vehicles for tax avoidance.
42 226 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 19595).
43 Rev. Rul. 56-250, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 659.
44 Estate of Clarence H. Loeb, 29 T.C. No. 4 (1957); Estate of Ernest J. Wile, 16 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 929 (1957).
45 Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 281-88 (1956).
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